


Jain authors on sentence-meaning

Andrew Ollett, UC Riverside, April 30, 2026



Vidyānandin (Digambara, Mūlasaṅgha, d. of Vardhamāna; Karnataka, 920s–940s):

Tattvārthaślōkavārtika (commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*):

Manōharalāla (ed.). *Śrīmadvidyānandisvāviracitaṁ Tattvārthaślōkavārtikam*. Gāṁdhīnāthhāraṅga-Jainagrāṁthamālā, Mumbāī, Nirṇaya-sāgarākhyā-mudraṇayantrālayē, 1918.

Abhayadēva (Śvētāmbara, Candragaccha, d. of Pradyumna; Dhārā, 970s–1020s):

Tattvabōdhavidhāyini (a.k.a. *Vādamahārṇava*) (commentary on Siddhasēna's *Sanmatitarka*):

Sukhalāla Saṅghavī and Bēcaradāsa Dōṣī (eds.). Saṁh. 1985 [1928 CE]. *Ācāryaśrīsiddhasēnadivākarapraṇītaṁ Saṁmatitarka-prakaraṇam, Jainaśvētāmbara-Rājagacchīya-Pradyumnasūrisiṣya-Tarkapañcānana-Śrīmad-Abhayadēvasūrinirmityā Tattvabōdhavidhāyiniyā Vyākhyayā Vibhūṣitam*. Ahmedabad: Gujarāta Vidyāpīṭha.

Prabhācandra (Digambara, d. of Māṇikyanandin; Dhārā, 1030s–1050s):

Pramēyakamalamārtanḍa (commentary on Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*), 1030s:

Mahendra Kumar Shastri (ed.). 1990. *Prameyakamala-mārtanḍa* [sic] by Shri Prabha Chandra (A Commentary on Shri Manik Nandi's Pareeksha Mukh Sutra). Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. First edition 1912.

Nyāyakumudacandra (commentary on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyastraya*), ca. 1057:

Mahendra Kumar Nyayacharya (ed.). 1941. *Nyāya Kumud Chandra of Śrīmat Prabhāchandrāchārya (A Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalāṅkadēva's Laghīyastraya). Part II*. Ed. Bombay: Māṇik Chandra Dig. Jain Series (no. 39).

Śālikanātha (Mīmāṃsakaśīrōmaṇi, Mithilā? 775?)

Vākyārthamātrkā:

Subrahmanya Śāstrī (ed.). 1961. *Prakaraṇapañcikā Mahāmahōpadhyāyāśrīmacchālikanāthamiśraviracitā*. Benares: Benares Hindu University.

- (1) *ata ēva na vivakṣā-pratibhāsinam artham pratipādayantaḥ śabdā anumānatām āsādayanti agraḥīta-pratibandhād api vākya-viśēṣād yathōkta-nyāyatō vākya-rtha-pratipattēḥ. anēnaiva abhiprāyēṇa saugatā vākya-gatām cintām anādrīya padam ēva anumānē 'ntarbhāvitavantaḥ. (Tattvabōdhavidhāyinī p. 738 ll. 6–8)*

It is for this very reason that linguistic expressions don't bring about inference when they convey a meaning that reflects the speaker's intention, since for the reasons just discussed, one apprehends a sentence-meaning from a particular sentence even without having previously grasped that sentence's connection to that meaning. This is the idea behind the Buddhists' **ignoring the discussion of the sentence** and including only the word within inference.

- (2) *ākhyātam śabda-saṅghātō jātiḥ saṅghāta-vartinī ~
ēkō 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ kramō buddhy-anusāhṛtiḥ ~
padam ādyaṁ pṛthak sarvaṁ padam sāpēkṣam ity api ~
vākyaṁ prati matir bhinnā bahudhā nyāya-darśinām ~
Trikaṇḍī (a.k.a. Vākyapadīya) 2.1–2*
- (3) *iti vākya-tad-avayavābhēda-bhēdaikānta-vādinām upālabhaḥ, syādvādinām yathāpratīti kathañcit tadabhēdōpagamāt ēkānekākārapratītē ēkānekātmakasya jātyantarasya vyavasthitēḥ. (p. 426 ll. 6–7)*

These criticisms apply to those who one-sidedly insist on the identity or difference of the sentence and its parts, because for the Syādvādins, who accept the identity of the sentence and its parts in certain respects depending on our intuition (*yathāpratīti*), it belongs to a completely different category (?), being one or many depending on our intuition of one or many aspects.

- (4) *padāny ēva padārtha-pratipādana-pūrvakam vākya-rthābhābhādhā vidadhānāni vākya-vyapadēśam pratipadyantē, tathā pratītē. (Tattvārthaślōkavārttika, p. 427 ll. 30–31 ≈ Pramāyākamalamārtanḍa p. 461 ll. 1–2, omits tathā pratītē)*

The words themselves receive the designation “sentence” when they produce an awareness of the sentence-meaning after conveying the word-meanings, because that is how we intuit it.

- (5) *yadi punaḥ padānām dvau vyāpārau svārthābhīdhānē vyāpāraḥ padārthāntarē gamakatva-vyāpāraś ca, tadā katham na padārtha-pratipattir āvṛtīyā prasajyatē? padavyāpārāt pratīyamānasya gamyamānasyāpi (Pr. pratīyamānasyēva gamyamānasyāpi) padārthatvād abhidhīyamānārthavat. (Tattvārthaślōkavārttika p. 428 l. 14 ≈ Pramāyākamalamārtanḍa p. 464 l. 11)*

If, however, words had two functions — one to express their proper meanings one to cause the other word-meanings to be understood — then how could it not follow that word-meanings were understood repetitively (*āvṛtīyā*)? For a meaning that is “understood” from a function of the words, even if it is [merely?] “gotten,” is just as much a word-meaning as a meaning that is “expressed.”

- (6) *padārthēbhyō 'pēkṣā-buddhi-sannidhānāt (V. sannidhāt) parasparam anvitēbhyō vākyārtha-pratipattiḥ. paramparayā padēbhya ēva bhāvān na tatō vyatiriktam vākyam astīti cēt, tarhi prakṛti-pratyayēbhyaḥ prakṛti-pratyayārthāḥ pratīyantē tēbhyō 'pēkṣābuddhisannidhānād anyōnyam anvitēbhyāḥ padārtha-pratipattir iti prakṛty-ādi-vyatiriktam padam api mā bhūt, prakṛty-ādīnām anvitānām abhidhānē abhihitānām vānvayē (V. abhidhānam abhihitānām anvayē) padārtha-pratipatti-siddhēḥ. (Tattvārthaślōkavārttika p. 429 l. 8 ≈ Pramēyakamalamārtanḍa p. 464 l. 5)*

One might claim that the apprehension of the sentence meaning arises from the word-meanings, which are related to each other on account of **dependency-awareness-proximity**, and that because that apprehension comes indirectly from the words themselves, the sentence is not distinct from the words. But consider this: the meanings of the stem and suffix are understood from the stem and suffix themselves, and the apprehension of the word-meaning arises from those meanings, which are related to each other on account of **dependency-awareness-proximity**. In that case you would be unable to say that word is distinct from the stem and so on (which you, Mīmāṃsaka, presumably **do** want to be able to say), because the apprehension of the word-meaning could be established either through the expression of the related [meanings] of the stem and so on or through the relation of [those same meanings] once they are expressed.

- (7) *varṇānām parasparāpēkṣāṇām nirapēkṣaḥ samudāyaḥ padam, padānām tu tadapēkṣāṇām nirapēkṣaḥ samudāyō vākyam (Pramēyakamalamārtanḍa p. 458 l. 6)*

A word is an independent collection of mutually-dependent speech-sounds, and a sentence is an independent collection of mutually-dependent words.

- (8) *itarētarāśrayam idānīm pariharati —*

smṛti-sannihitair ēvam arthair anvitam ātmanāḥ ~

artham āha padam sarvam iti nānōnya-saṁśrayaḥ ~ 15

svārtha-svarūpa-mātra-smaraṇē hi na padam padāntaram apēkṣatē. smṛti-sannihitam apīdam bhavaty ēva sannihitam. nāsti tēnētarētarāśrayatvam. (Vākyārthamāṭrkā p. 406)

He now refutes the charge of circular reasoning:

There is no circular reasoning,
because a word expresses its proper meaning
in its entirety, which is related
in this way to the other meanings,
which have been made proximate
through recollection. (15)

For a word does not depend on another word to call the proper form of its own meaning to mind. Even if it is made proximate by recollection, it is still proximate. There is no circular reasoning on that account.

- (9) *padam ca padārthasyāpi smāraakatvād na vācakam. na ca vākyārthē smaryamāṇa-padārtha-sambaddhatayāvijñātē padārtha-smaraṇānyathānupapattyā pratipattir yuktā. na ca sambandhō vākyārthēna saha kasyacid avagantum śakyaḥ sambandhy-avagama-purassaratvāt sambandha-pratipattēḥ. smaryamāṇa-padārtha-pratipatty-anyathānupapattim ca vinā nānyatō vākyārtha-pratipattiḥ tām antarēṇa ca nānyathānupapattēḥ pravṛttiḥ iti itarētarāśraya-pravṛttēr na kathaṇcid vākyārtha-pratipattiḥ syāt. (Tattvabōdhavidhāyinī p. 743 ll. 5–10)*

Moreover, the word doesn't express even the word-meaning, since it merely calls it to mind (*smāraka*). And it would not make sense for the apprehension [of the sentence-meaning to be postulated] on the basis of the fact that it would be impossible for the word-meanings to be recalled otherwise unless one [also] cognized the sentence-meaning as being *related* to the word-meanings that are in fact recalled. And it is not possible to understand *anything* whatsoever as being connected to a sentence-meaning, because the apprehension of a connection is preceded by an understanding of what is connected [and *ex hypothesi* there is not yet an apprehension of the sentence-meaning]. The apprehension of sentence-meaning does not arise from anything *other than* the impossibility otherwise of the apprehension of the word-meanings that are called to mind, but this impossibility otherwise would not operate without that apprehension [of the sentence-meaning]. Hence there could be no apprehension of the sentence-meaning at all, because its operation depends on circular reasoning.

- (10) *Ēkānta-vādivākyaṭ tu dṛṣṭārthē 'pi viśaṁvādīnaḥ sarvathā apravṛttir ēva niścita-viśaṁvādāṅguly-agra-hasti-yūtha-śata-pratipādaka-vākyaḍivat. na hi ēkāntavādi-vacanānām vācyaṁ sambhavi ity uktam. yataḥ sāmānyam vā tad-vācyaṁ bhavēt, viśēṣō vā, ubhayam anubhayaṁ vēti vikalpaḥ. (Tattvabōdhavidhāyinī p. 737 ll. 40–42)*

By contrast, there can be no engagement in action at all on the basis of a sentence of someone who takes a one-sided view, since that deviates from even a perceptible object, like the statement that conveys “a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of a finger,” which is known to deviate from a real state of affairs. For we have already said that the statements of one who takes a one-sided view cannot possibly express anything, since the only options are that what they express is a general, a particular, both, or neither.

- (11) *nāpi anvitānām kriyā-kāraḍādīnām ēkāntatōbhidhānam, yataḥ padārthaḥ padārthāntara-saṁsakta ēva yaḍi padēna abhidhīyatē tadā prathama-padēnaiva vākyaṛthasya abhihitatvāt śēṣa-padōccāraṇam anarthakam āsajyēta, padasya ca vākya-rūpatā-prasaktiḥ viśēṣābhidhāyitvāt yāvanti ca vākyaḥ padāni tāvanti vākyaṇi syuḥ yāvantaś ca padārthā vākyaṛthā api tāvanta ēva prasajyēran. yaḍi ca padārthānēkatvē 'pi ēka ēva vākyaṛthas tadā pratipāditārtha-pratipāḍakatvāt śēṣa-padārtha-padānām paunaruktyam āsajyēta. anvitārthābhidhāyakatvē ca padasya gauḥ ity uktē gacchati-āḍi-kriyā-viśēṣākāṅkṣā na syāt, tata ēva kriyā-viśēṣa-saṁsargasya avagatatvāt. (Tattvabōdhavidhāyinī p. 743 ll. 32–38)*

Nor is it the case that [word-meanings] that are related, such as the action and its factors, are expressed one-sidedly. For if it was only a word-meaning that is already connected to other word-meanings that is expressed by a word, then the sentence-meaning would be expressed by the very first word, and hence it would follow that the utterance of the remaining words would serve no purpose, and it would follow that the word takes the form of the sentence, because it would express a particular. And it would follow that there would be as many sentences as there are words, and as many sentence-meanings as there are word-meanings. And if there were a single sentence-meaning despite the word-meanings being multiple, it would follow that the remaining word-meanings would be redundant, because they would convey meanings that have already been conveyed. And if the word were to express a meaning that is related, then when “cow” is uttered, there would not be a dependency for a particular verbal action such as “goes,” because the connection with a particular verbal action would already have been understood from that single word.